



Today's Daf In Review is being sent l'zecher nishmas Habachur Yechezkel Shraga A"H ben R' Avrohom Yehuda

Menachos Daf Kuf Gimmel

MISHNA

- If someone promises to bring a mincha of barley, he must bring a mincha of wheat. If he promised to bring a mincha of "kemach" (regular flour), he must bring a mincha of "soles" (fine flour). If he promised to bring a mincha without oil and levonah, he must bring a mincha with oil and levonah. If he promised to bring a half issaron, he must bring a full issaron. If he promised to bring 1.5 issaron, he must bring 2 issaron. **R' Shimon** said, the person who promises in any of these ways would be patur from having to bring a mincha, because he has not promised to bring something that is brought.

GEMARA

- **Q:** Why don't we view the second part of his statement as a retraction of his promise to bring the korbon (since he knows that a mincha cannot be brought as he states in the second part of his statement, we should view it as a retraction of his promise to bring a mincha)? **A: Chizkiya** said, this Mishna follows **B"S** who say that when a person makes a contradictory statement, we follow the first part of the statement. **R' Yochanan** said the Mishna can even follow **B"H**, because the Mishna is talking about a case where the person then said, had I known that I must bring the mincha with wheat, or soles, etc., I would have promised to do so.
 - **Chizkiya** said, the **T"K** only says it is a valid promise when he promised to bring a mincha of barley (since there is a concept of a mincha being brought from barley, albeit not a donated one), but a promise to bring a mincha of lentils would not be a valid promise and would not create an obligation.
 - **Q: Chizkiya** explained that the Mishna is following **B"S**. The reason of **B"S** is that they say we follow the first part of the statement. If so, why would it make a difference whether he said barley or lentils? **A: Chizkiya** retracted his answer that the Mishna follows **B"S**. **Rava** explained, the reason he retracted is because the Mishna gave the example of where he promised to bring a mincha of barley. Why didn't it give an example of where he promised a mincha of lentils, which would be a bigger chiddush? It must be that the Mishna specifically gave the example of barley, because it is that case where a person can have made a mistake and thought that a promise can be made to bring a mincha of barley. However, one cannot even mistakenly think that a mincha can be brought from lentils, and therefore, in that case he would not be obligated to bring a mincha.
 - **R' Yochanan** said, the **T"K** even says it is a valid promise when he promised to bring a mincha of lentils.
 - **Q: R' Yochanan** explained that the Mishna follows **B"H**. According to them, the reason the promise is effective is because the person mistakenly thought that one may bring a mincha of barley. That thought process does not apply to a mincha of lentils, so why would that statement create an obligation? **A: R' Yochanan** made this statement according to **Chizkiya**. He was saying to **Chizkiya**, why did you retract your opinion that the Mishna follows **B"S**? It is because the Mishna didn't give the example of lentils. Maybe the Mishna didn't give the example of lentils because that is actually the more obvious case!? If he promises to bring a mincha of lentils we would say to follow only the first part of his statement, because saying he wants to bring a mincha from lentils is clearly an attempt to retract the promise, which **B"S** say he can't do, because we follow the first part of his statement. However, when he promises to bring barley, it is more possible to say that he is making an honest mistake and was not trying to

retrace his promise, and it therefore is not two separate statements that are to be divided. The Mishna is teaching that even in that case we say that we divide the statement and only give effect to the first part of the statement.

- **Ze'iri** said, the promise obligates him to bring a mincha of wheat only when he promised to bring a "mincha min hase'orim" (we would view that as two statements that can be divided). However, if he promised to bring a "minchas se'orim" or just "se'orim" (second understanding of Rashi), the statement can't be divided and he would not be obligated to bring a mincha.
 - **Q: R' Nachman** repeated this and **Rava** asked him, the Mishna then gives the case of a promise to bring "kemach" and says he would have to bring "soles". The Mishna makes no mention of him saying the word "mincha" and still says that it creates an obligation!? **A:** The Mishna refers back to the first case and means that there was a mention of "mincha" there as well.
 - **Q:** The Mishna then gives the case of a promise to bring "without oil or levonah" and says he would have to bring "with oil and levonah". The Mishna makes no mention of him saying the word "mincha" and still says that it creates an obligation!? **A:** The Mishna refers back to the first case and means that there was a mention of "mincha" there as well.
 - **Q:** The Mishna then gives the case of a promise to bring "a half issaron" and says he would have to bring "a full issaron". The Mishna makes no mention of him saying the word "mincha" and still says that it creates an obligation!? **A:** The Mishna refers back to the first case and means that there was a mention of "mincha" there as well.
 - **Q:** If so, the last case of the Mishna would be where he promised to bring "a mincha of an issaron and a half". In that case we would view the phrase "a mincha of an issaron" as obligating him to bring a regular mincha, and the remaining words of "and a half issaron" should be viewed as not creating an obligation at all!? Why does the Mishna say that he must bring 2 issaron!? **A:** The case is where he promised to bring "a mincha of a half issaron and an issaron". When he says "a mincha" he becomes obligated to bring a mincha of an issaron. The words "half issaron" create no obligation. The words "an issaron" create an obligation for a second issaron. That is why he must bring two issaron.
 - **Q:** If this is the way to understand the Mishna, why does **R' Shimon** argue and say that there is no obligation because he has not donated in the way that people donate? Since the Mishna follows **B" S**, who only look at the first part of each statement, he has obligated himself in the way that people obligate themselves!? **A:** **Rava** said, **R' Shimon** follows the view of **R' Yose**, who says that we also look to the end of a person's statement and give effect to it as well.

MISHNA

- A person may donate a mincha of up to 60 issaron and bring it all in one keili. If he promises to donate a mincha of 61 issaron, he brings 60 issaron in one keili and one issaron in a second keili. For we find that the tzibbur brings a mincha of 61 issaron on the first day of Succos that falls on a Shabbos. It is therefore fitting that an individual can only bring a maximum of one issaron less than the largest mincha of the tzibbur. **R' Shimon** said, the 61 issaron brought by the tzibbur is a combination of issaron offered with different parim and with different lambs. The issaron for the different korbanos are not mixed together (so why would this serve as the basis for the maximum amount of issaron that can be brought in one keili)!? Rather, the reason that only 60 issaron can be brought in one keili is that up to 60 issaron, the oil and flour are capable of being mixed, whereas if there are more than 60 issaron, the oil and flour are not capable of being mixed. The **Rabanan** said to him, can it really be that 60 can be effectively mixed, but 61 cannot? **R' Shimon** said, all measurements of the **Rabanan** are such (they are given as an exact measure). For example, they say that in 40 se'ah a person can be toivel himself, but in 40 se'ah less one kortov a person cannot be toivel himself.

GEMARA

- It was asked in front of **R' Yehuda bar Illai**, how do we know that when a person promises to bring a mincha of 61 issaron, he brings 60 in one keili and one in a second keili? **R' Yehuda bar Illai** said, for we find that the tzibbur brings a mincha of 61 issaron on the first day of Succos that falls on a Shabbos. It is therefore fitting that an individual can only bring a maximum of one issaron less than the largest mincha of the tzibbur. **R' Shimon** said, the 61 issaron brought by the tzibbur is a combination of issaron offered with different parim and rams and with different lambs, which have different thicknesses to them (the amount of oil per issaron of flour is different for different animals), and which are mixed at different times of the day (depending on the korbon), and therefore are not mixed together (so why would this serve as the basis for the maximum amount of issaron that can be brought in one keili)!? He said to **R' Shimon**, you tell us the reason then. **R' Shimon** said, the Torah says to bring a mincha that can be mixed (and 60 issaron can be mixed, whereas 61 cannot). **R' Yehuda** said to him, can it really be that 60 can be effectively mixed, but 61 cannot? **R' Shimon** said, all measurements of the **Rabanan** are such (they are given as an exact measure). For example, they say that in 40 se'ah a person can be toivel himself, but in 40 se'ah less one kortov a person cannot be toivel himself; food the size of a beitzah is subject to food tumah, but if it is smaller by the size of a sesame seed it would not; a cloth that is 3x3 tefachim could become tamei medras, whereas if it is 3x3 less one thread it does not.
 - **Q:** Why is it problematic if it can't be mixed? A Mishna says that if the oil and the flour were not mixed the mincha is still valid!? **A: R' Zeira** said, if a mincha is fit to be mixed, mixing is not essential, but if it is not fit to be mixed, mixing is essential.
- **R' Bibi in the name of R' Yehoshua ben Levi** said, it once happened that a mule of **Rebbi** died, and the **Rabanan** measured the blood to see if there was a revi'is of blood, in which case it would give off tumah. **R' Yitzchak bar Bisna** asked, a Braisa says that **R' Yehoshua and R' Yehoshua ben Beseira** testified that blood of a neveila is tahor, and **R' Yehoshua ben Beseira** cited an incident where the people going up to be oleh regel walked through blood of a neveila and the **Chachomim** did not stop them from entering the Beis Hamikdash complex!? **R' Bibi** remained silent. **R' Zrika** said to him, why didn't you answer? **R' Bibi** explained that he was not financially stable and therefore did not have the presence of mind to answer.
 - **Q:** What is the answer to this seeming contradiction from the Braisa? **A: R' Yosef** said, **R' Yehuda** was the posek for the Nasi (for the house of **Rebbi**), and it was therefore he who paskened that a revi'is of blood would be tamei. He follows his own view elsewhere in a Braisa where he says that **B"H** hold that the blood of a neveila is tamei.