



Today's Daf In Review is being sent l'zecher nishmas Habachur Yechezkel Shraga A"H ben R' Avrohom Yehuda

Zevachim Daf Gimmel

- **Ravina** continues to tell **R' Pappa** about **Rava's** discussion that **R' Pappa** missed hearing.
 - **Rava** asked, did **R' Yehuda in the name of Rav** really say that a chatas that is shechted for the sake of an olah is passul, but a chatas that is shechted for the sake of chullin is valid? That would mean that he holds that something of its own kind (i.e. another korbon) effects it, but something not of its own kind (chullin) does not effect it. Now, a Mishna regarding get says that a get written not for the sake of the woman to be divorced is passul, and in that case we say that even if it is written for the sake of a non-Jewish woman (who is not subject to the laws of get, and is therefore "not of its own kind") is also passul!? **Rava** answered, the difference between these cases is, in the case of get, if we remove the intent for the goy it would be viewed as a get without specific intention for anybody, and such a get is passul. Regarding the korbanos, if we remove the intent for the chullin it would be viewed as a korbon brought without specific intent, and we have learned that such a korbon is valid.
 - **Rava** then asked another contradiction. He asked, did **R' Yehuda in the name of Rav** really say that a chatas that is shechted for the sake of an olah is passul, but a chatas that is shechted for the sake of chullin is valid? That would mean that he holds that something of its own kind (i.e. another korbon) effects it but something not of its own kind (chullin) does not effect it. Now, a Braisa that discusses a sheretz falling into an earthenware keili (in which case anything within the airspace of the keili becomes tamei) says that the pasuk says "tocho" (anything within it becomes tamei), and we darshen "v'lo toch tocho" (something that is within something that is within this keili – if there is a keili inside the earthenware keili and the inside keili has food in it, the inside keili acts as a barrier to the tumas sheretz that is within the outside keili and the food does not become tamei), and this is even if the inside keili is made of a material that could become tahor in a mikvah (it is not made of earthenware like the outside keili). This shows that even things that are not of its own kind create a separation and effect each other. If so, why is the chatas that was shechted for the sake of chullin still valid!? **Rava** answered, that they treated chullin with regard to kodashim as a mechitza (a partition) is treated in an oven. Just as a mechitza in an oven would not serve to prevent tumah from spreading to the entire oven, so too chullin has no effect on kodashim. The case of the Braisa is different, because that is not a case of mechitza, but is rather a case of keili. All keilim are of one category. Therefore, even a keili of a different material will effect and act as a barrier to the tumah in the outside keili.
 - **Rava** explained, that we see this halacha in a Mishna. The Mishna says, if a mechitza of boards or curtains is put into an earthenware oven and a sheretz is found on one side of the mechitza, the entire oven is tamei. If a basket that had holes that were plugged with straw and was then lowered into an oven, if a sheretz is in the basket, the oven is tamei, and if a sheretz is in the oven, everything in the basket is tamei. **R' Eliezer** says, these cases are tahor (the mechitza is effective in creating a barrier for the tumah). **R' Eliezer** explains that there is a kal v'chomer – if a mechitza in a room can prevent the stringent tumas meis from spreading to an entire room, then certainly it should prevent tumas sheretz from spreading to the entire oven!? The **Rabanan** said this is not a valid kal v'chomer. A partition can prevent tumah from spreading to an entire room, because people normally partition a room, and it is therefore viewed as now being two separate rooms. It does not prevent the tumah spreading in a keili, because people do not normally partition keilim.

- **Q:** Rava's explanation of **Rav** works well according to the **Rabanan** (the **T"K** of the Mishna), but does not work according to **R' Eliezer**!? **A:** **R' Eliezer** would agree that items that are not of the same kind do not effect (which is why the intent for chullin will make the chatas valid). It is only in this case of tumah, where he darshens this kal v'chomer, that he holds differently.

 - **Q:** He should darshen a kal v'chomer by kodashim as well!? He should say – if kodashim can profane and make passul other kodashim, then certainly chullin should profane kodashim!? **A:** Rather, we will say that **Rav** follows the view of **R' Elazar**, who darshens a pasuk to teach that only kodashim can profane other kodashim, and chullin cannot profane kodashim.

 - **Q:** If a pasuk comes and teaches us not to darshen the kal v'chomer regarding kodashim, we should also say that the pasuk of "tocho" should come and teach us not to darshen the kal v'chomer regarding tumah in the oven!? **A:** The pasuk of "tocho" is needed for a different drasha and is therefore not available to teach this.
- **R' Yosef bar Ami** asked a similar contradiction – between intent for a different korbon and intent for a different owner. He asked, did **Rav** really say that a chatas that was shechted for the sake of another type of chatas is valid, but if it is shechted for the sake of an olah it is passul? That would mean that he holds that something not of its own kind (i.e. a different korbon) effects it but something of its own kind (another chatas) does not effect it. We find that **Rav** said that a chatas that was shechted for the sake of someone else who was chayuv to bring a chatas is passul, but if he has in mind for the sake of someone who is chayuv to bring an olah it is valid. This shows that he holds that something of its own kind effects it, but something not of its own kind does not effect it!? **R' Yosef bar Ami** answered, with regard to intent for the proper korbon the pasuk says "v'shachat osah l'chatas", and the chatas was shechted for the sake of a chatas and it is therefore valid. With regard to intent for the owner the pasuk says "v'chiper alav", which we darshen to mean that the korbon must be brought for him, and noone else, but also means that it is only passul for someone who needs this kappara like he does.
- **R' Chaviva** asked a similar contradiction – between intent for someone other than the owner and the halacha of "tocho". He asked, did **Rav** really say that a chatas that was shechted for the sake of someone else who was chayuv to bring a chatas is passul, but if he has in mind for the sake of someone who is chayuv to bring an olah it is valid? This shows that he holds that something of its own kind effects it, but something not of its own kind does not effect it. However, the Braisa regarding the keili within the earthenware keili (discussed above) teaches that even things not of its own kind effect and act to separate!? **R' Chaviva** answered, the pasuk says "tocho" twice, which allows for 4 drashas (toch, tocho, toch, tocho). One is to teach the halacha that food within the earthenware keili becomes tamei, one is for a gezeira shava to teach that when a sheretz is lowered into the airspace of an earthenware keili it makes the keili tamei even without touching it, one is to teach that this halacha is only for earthenware keilim, and one teaches that in this case even something not of its own kind effects. Therefore, this case is an exception to the general rule, because of the drasha of the pasuk.