



## Daf In Review – Weekly Chazarah

### Maseches Zevachim, Daf כז – Daf לז

Daf In Review is being sent l'zecher nishmas R' Avrohom Abba ben R' Dov HaKohen, A"H  
vl'zecher nishmas Habachur Yechezkel Shraga A"H ben R' Avrohom Yehuda

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- **Q:** A Braisa says, if the Kohen intended to do the zrika below when it should have really been done above the red line, or visa-versa, then if he intended to do so on the same day (when the zrika should have been done) it is valid. Therefore, if he then intends to consume the korbon outside its place, it is passul and there is no kares. However, if he had then intended to consume it beyond its proper time, it would make the korbon into piggul and there would be kares. On the other hand, if he had initially intended to do the zrika in the wrong place on the *next* day, it is passul. Therefore, if he then intended to consume it outside its place or beyond its proper time, it would be passul and there would be no kares. Now, according to **Shmuel**, who says that a zrika not in its proper place is considered to be in its proper place, in this second case why is it only passul? It should be piggul!? **A: Mar Zutra** said, a zrika that permits meat to be eaten can make a korbon into piggul, but a zrika that cannot, will not make a korbon into piggul.
  - **R' Ashi** asked **Mar Zutra**, how do you know this halacha? **Mar Zutra** said, the pasuk says “v'ihm hei'achol yei'acheil mibsar zevach shelamav pigul yihiyeh”, which teaches that kares only applies when it is the piggul intent that caused it to become assur to be eaten. Therefore, in the case of the Brasia, it was a different issur that caused it to be assur to be eaten, and that is why there is no kares.
    - **Q:** If so, the intent to do the zrika not in its proper place should not even make the korbon passul!? **A: R' Nachman bar Yitzchak** said, the intent to do the zrika in the wrong place the next day is no different than the intent to leave the blood over until the next day, and the Braisa follows the view of **R' Yehuda**, who says that such an intent makes a korbon passul.
- **Reish Lakish** said that when the Mishna says that when the zrika is done in the wrong place the korbon is passul, it means that the korbon is actually passul. He also holds that a zrika not in the proper place is considered to be a zrika for purposes of kapparah. Still, there is no difficulty. The pasuk that teaches that a zrika in the wrong place still brings a kapparah is talking about where the zrika was done in silence – without an invalidating intent. The Mishna that says the korbon is passul is referring to where the Kohen said that he is offering with intent that the korbon would be consumed beyond its time.
  - The Gemara says that all the questions that were asked on **Shmuel** can also be asked on **Reish Lakish**, and all the answers we gave for **Shmuel** can be used for **Reish Lakish** as well.
- **R' Yochanan** said that both Mishnayos refer to a case where the Kohen did the zrika without saying anything. Also, a zrika done in the wrong place is *not* as if it is done in the right place. The Mishna that says that the zrika can be done again is talking about where there is still lifeblood coming from the animal, and the Mishna that says the korbon is passul is discussing where there is no more lifeblood coming from the animal.
  - **Q:** Our Mishna said that the korbon is passul but there is no kares. Now, according to **Reish Lakish** it makes sense why the Mishna had to say there is no kares (because normally a piggul intent creates a chiyuv kares). However, according to **R' Yochanan**, why would we think there is kares? This is a KASHYEH.
  - **Q:** According to **Shmuel**, who also said that the case was that the Kohen did the zrika with no bad intent, why does the Mishna have to say that there is no kares? **A:** The Mishna means to say, if the zrika was done in the wrong place and there was a piggul intent, it would be passul but there would be no kares.
  - **Q:** According to **R' Yochanan**, if a zrika done in the wrong place is *not* as if it is done in the right place, the blood should be like blood that spilled onto the floor, in which case the halacha is that the blood can be gathered up and applied to the proper place!? **A:** He holds like the view that blood that was applied to the Mizbe'ach not in its proper place may not be gathered up and reapplied. It is only when it spills elsewhere that it may be gathered and applied.

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- **R' Nachman bar Yitzchak** said, we have learned this in a Braisa as well. The Braisa discusses that there are many circumstances where a passul korbon that was brought onto the Mizbe'ach is not to be taken off, but is rather burned on the Mizbe'ach. There is a machlokes as to which type of psulim this applies to. **R' Yehuda** says that a korbon whose blood spilled is not to be left on the Mizbe'ach, but is instead brought down. **R' Shimon** argues and states a number of psulim which would be left on the Mizbe'ach. Included in his list is a korbon whose blood was applied in the wrong place. **R' Yehuda** doesn't argue with this psul, and would agree that the korbon would not be taken off the Mizbe'ach. We see that the case of zrika in the wrong place is not the same as the case of blood that spilled on the floor!
- **R' Elazar** said, the inside Mizbe'ach (in the Heichal) is mekadesh passul korbanos that are put onto it, so that they need not be taken off it.
  - **Q:** The Braisa just quoted said this as well!? **A:** We would think that the Braisa only applies to blood of a korbon that was placed there, since blood is something that is put onto the inside Mizbe'ach, but not to the kemitza of a korbon mincha, since a mincha is never brought on the inside Mizbe'ach.
  - **Q:** A Braisa says, a "ketores zara" (an unauthorized ketores) that was put onto the Mizbe'ach must be taken off it, because only the outside Mizbe'ach is mekadesh passul offerings that are fit for it. This suggests that the inside Mizbe'ach is not mekadesh passul korbanos!? **A:** The Braisa should be understood as saying that a ketores zara that is placed on the outside Mizbe'ach must be brought down, because the outside Mizbe'ach is only mekadesh korbanos that are fit for it. However, the inside Mizbe'ach is mekadesh things that are fit for it and things that are not fit for it. The reason for this difference is, that the outside Mizbe'ach is considered to have the status of the floor of the Azarah, whereas the inside Mizbe'ach has the status of a kli shareis.

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### MISHNA

- If someone shechts a korbon with intent to do zrika outside the area where it is allowed, or to do zrika on part of the blood outside the allowable area, or he intends to burn the parts that must be burned on the Mizbe'ach at a place beyond where they may be burned or to do so for part of these parts, or he intends to eat the meat outside the allowable area or even a to eat a kezayis of the meat outside the allowable area, or to eat a kezayis of the skin of the tail outside the allowable area, the korbon is passul, but there is no kares if someone then eats from this korbon.
- If someone shechts a korbon with intent to do zrika beyond the allowable time or to do zrika on part of the blood beyond the allowable time, or he intends to burn the parts that must be burned on the Mizbe'ach beyond the allowable time or to do so for part of these parts, or he intends to eat the meat beyond the allowable time or even a to eat a kezayis of the meat beyond the allowable time, or to eat a kezayis of the skin of the tail beyond the allowable time, the korbon is piggul and there is kares if someone then eats from this korbon.

### GEMARA

- They thought that the skin of the tail has the status of the tail itself (and must be burned on the Mizbe'ach along with the tail).
  - **Q:** Based on this, when the Mishna says that he intended to eat the skin of the tail beyond its place or time, it means that he has an intention of eating for something that is meant to be burned on the Mizbe'ach, so why would it make the korbon passul!? **A:** **Shmuel** said, the Mishna follows the view of **R' Eliezer**, who argues on the **Rabanan** in a Mishna and says that when an intent is made to eat something that is meant to be burned, or to burn something that is meant to be eaten, beyond its place or time, it does make the korbon passul.
  - **Q:** The later part of our Mishna says that if someone does one of the avodos with intent to eat something that is meant to be eaten or to burn something that is meant to be burned, beyond its

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place or time, it is passul. The Mishna suggests that if the intent was to eat something that is meant to be burned, or visa-versa, it would not be passul. Can it be that the first part of the Mishna (our Mishna) follows **R' Eliezer** and the later part follows the **Rabanan**!? **A: Shmuel** said, yes, the first part follows **R' Eliezer** and the later part follows the **Rabanan**.

- **R' Huna** said, the skin of the tail does not have the status of the tail. **Rava** explained, this is based on the pasuk that requires the burning of the “chelbo ha’alya” – the fats of the tail must be burned, not the skin.
- **R' Chisda** said, that the skin of the tail does have the status of the tail. Our Mishna is referring to the tail of a goat, which is not burned on the Mizbe’ach (only the tail of a sheep is burned on the Mizbe’ach).
- **R' Huna and R' Chisda** don’t want to say like **Shmuel**, because they don’t want parts of the same Mishna to have to follow different opinions. **Shmuel and R' Chisda** don’t want to say like **R' Huna**, because they hold that the skin of the tail has the status of the tail. **Shmuel and R' Huna** don’t want to say like **R' Chisda**, because according to him the Mishna is coming to teach that the skin of the tail has the status of the tail (and since it is edible, an intent regarding it makes the korbon passul). They hold this teaching is not needed, because another Mishna clearly teaches that the skin under the tail has the status of meat. **R' Chisda** said, that from that Mishna we would think it is only so for purposes of tumah, but for purposes of a korbon only things which are eaten by kings are considered fit to be eaten, and therefore this skin should not be considered something fit to be eaten. The Mishna therefore teaches that for purposes of these bad intents the skin of the tail is considered to be something that is eaten.
- **Q:** A Braisa says that an olah that is shechted with intent to burn a kezayis of the skin of the tail makes the korbon passul. The Braisa suggests that this is only the case for an olah, but not for other korbanos. Now, according to **R' Huna** this is not difficult, because only the skin of the tail of an olah is burned. However, according to **R' Chisda**, why does the Braisa limit its halacha to an olah? **A: R' Chisda** would say, either the Braisa is discussing the tail of a goat, which is only burned by an olah, or we will say that the Braisa should be amended to take out the word olah and insert the word “zevach” (referring to all korbanos).

### PASSUL V'EIN BO KARES...

- **Q:** How do we know that a beyond the place intent makes the korbon passul but there is no kares, and a beyond the time intend makes it passul and there is kares? **A: Shmuel** said, there are two pesukim – one refers to beyond the place and the other to beyond the time, and only the one of beyond the time states that there is kares.
  - **Q:** What are the pesukim? **A: Rabbah** said, when the pasuk says “shlishi” it refers to an intent for beyond its time, and when the pasuk then says “piggul” it refers to an intent beyond its place. The pasuk then says “v’hanefesh ha’ocheles mimenu” – which is written in the singular and teaches that only one of these intents carries the kares penalty, and it is the intent of beyond its time, not the intent of beyond its place.
    - **Q:** Maybe the kares penalty applies to beyond the place and excludes beyond the time!? **A:** It is logical to say that beyond its time is worse, since (as we darshened above) that it is discussed earlier in the pasuk.
    - **Q:** If anything it is more logical to say that beyond its place is the one that carries kares, since it is written closer to the punishment of “v’hanefesh ha’ocheles mimenu”!? **A:** Rather, **Abaye** said that **R' Yitzchak bar Avdimi in the name of Rabbah** said, the Mishna is learning from a Braisa. The Braisa says, there is a pasuk in Parshas Kedoshim that discusses piggul. This pasuk seems unnecessary, since we have the other pasuk (quoted in part above) in Parshas Tzav that discusses piggul. It must be that the pasuk in Tzav (which mentions kares) discusses beyond its time and the pasuk in Kedoshim (which makes no mention of kares) discusses beyond its place. Although the very next pasuk in Kedoshim mentions kares, that pasuk limits the kares to the one

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who eats “nossar”, as the pasuk says “v’ochlav avono yisa” – the one who eats *it*, and not the one who eats the korbon which had intent for beyond its place.

- **Q:** Maybe the pasuk of “v’ochlav avono yisa” refers to the korbon with intent for beyond its place and comes to exclude one who eats nossar from the penalty of kares? **A:** It makes sense to say that nossar is referred to in the pasuk of kares, because we can then darshen the gezeira shava of “avon” to the case of intent for beyond its time, which is similar to nossar in that they both are a function of time, and both apply even to a korbon brought on a bamah.
- **Q:** It makes more sense to say that beyond its place is what is meant by the pasuk, because we can then darshen the gezeira shava of “avon” to the case of intent for beyond its time, which is similar to beyond its place in that they are both based on intent, they make the entire korbon passul even if the intent was made only on a portion of the korbon, they both can only take place during the 4 blood avodos, and both are learned from the words “the third day” in their respective pesukim!? **A:** Rather, **R’ Yochanan** said, **Zavdi bar Levi** taught a Braisa that says, that we have a gezeira shava on the word kodesh. In Kedoshim the pasuk says “es kodesh Hashem chilel v’nichrisa”, and another pasuk regarding nossar says “v’sarafta es hanossar ba’eish lo yei’acheil ki kodesh”. Just as the second pasuk is referring to nossar, the first pasuk is referring to nossar as well. The pasuk says “v’ochlav” which is an exclusionary term, and therefore excludes the intent of beyond its place from the kares penalty.
- **Q:** Why do we say that the long pasuk in Tzav refers to intent of beyond its time and the pasuk in Kedoshim refers to intent for beyond its place? Maybe we should say that the reverse is true? **A:** It makes sense to say that the long pasuk in Tzav refers to intent for beyond its time, because the gezeira shava of “avon” will teach that the pasuk in Tzav carries the kares penalty, and it makes more sense to say that intent for beyond its time is the one that is compared to nossar with this gezeira shava, because it is similar to nossar in that they both are a function of time and both apply even for a korbon offered on a bamah.
- **Q:** Maybe it makes more sense to say that the long pasuk in Tzav refers to intent for beyond its place and the pasuk in Kedoshim refers to intent for beyond its time, and the reason that intent for beyond its time is put there is so that it be next to nossar, which is written right next to that pasuk!? **A:** Rather, **Rava** says that all the halachos (intent for beyond its time, intent for beyond its place, and that only intent for beyond its time carries kares) are all learned from the long pasuk in Tzav. The pasuk should be darshened as follows:
  - “Hei’achol yei’acheil” – refers to two consumptions, human consumption and consumption of the Mizbe’ach.
  - “Mibsar zevach shelamav” – all korbanos are compared to a shelamim: just as a shelamim has a part that creates the piggul and a part that is subject to the issur of piggul, so too any korbon that has those aspects can be subject to piggul.
  - “Shlishi” – this refers to intent for beyond its time.
  - “Lo yeiratzeh” – just as a korbon does not become valid until all the avodos are completed, so too a korbon cannot become piggul unless all the avodos end up being completed (if the blood spills before the zrika the korbon cannot become piggul even if there was intent for beyond its time).
  - “Hamakriv” – it becomes piggul through being offered with the intent, not from actually being eaten after its time.
  - “Oso” – it is the korbon that becomes passul, not the Kohen who had the intent.
  - “Lo yeichasheiv” – it only becomes piggul if there were not other bad intentions that also make it passul at the time.

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- “Piggul – this refers to intent for beyond its place.
- “Yihyeh” – this teaches that the two types of intent can combine to make the korbon passul (if each intent was had on only half a kezayis).
- “V’hanefesh ha’ocheles mimenu” – only one of the intents creates a kares obligation – it is the intent for beyond its time. This is based on the gezeira shava of “avon” and the fact that this intent is similar to nossar in that they both are a function of time and both apply even for a korbon offered on a bamah.
- **Q: R’ Pappa** asked **Rava**, according to you, what does the “shlishi” in the pasuk in Kedoshim come to teach? **A: Rava** said, it teaches that the place in the intent for beyond its place must be a place which is sometimes fit for consumption of blood, of meat, and of “eimurim” (this comes to exclude an intent for beyond its place where the intent was for inside the Heichal).
  - **Q:** Why can’t that be learned from the pasuk in Tzav, from the fact that it uses the word “shlishi” there? **A: R’ Ashi** said that **R’ Masna** told him that if we only had that pasuk we would have thought to darshen that “shlishi” is a prat and “piggul” is a klal, which would include all places.

### -----Daf 29-----

- A Braisa says, the pasuk says “v’ihm hei’achol yei’acheil mibsar zevach shelamav”. **R’ Eliezer** said, listen close and I will explain that this pasuk is referring to a person who intends to eat from the korbon beyond its allowable time. You may say that it refers to someone who actually eats from the korbon after its allowable time, however that cannot be. If the korbon was already valid with all the avodos having been properly done, eating from it after its time cannot then make it passul and ineffective! **R’ Akiva** said, why do you say that cannot be? We find a similar concept regarding a zav and zava who have a chazaka of tahara, and yet, as soon as they see a discharge it removes them from their presumed state of tahara. The same can be with this korbon – although it was valid with valid avodos it may then become invalid! **R’ Eliezer** said, the pasuk says “hamakriv”, which means that the psul was done during the time of offering, which therefore must refer to an intent, and not to an actual eating on the third day. You may ask that “hamakriv” doesn’t teach this, but rather teaches that the Kohen becomes passul to do Avodah, I will say that this can’t be, because the pasuk says “oso”, which teaches that it is only the korbon that becomes passul, not the Kohen. **Ben Azzai** says that “oso” teaches that the psul of piggul makes the korbon not be accepted, but someone who delays the bringing of his korbon neder would not risk the korbon not being accepted. **Others** say, the pasuk says “lo yeichashev”, which teaches that it is a bad intent to eat the korbon after its allowable time that causes the korbon to be passul, not the actual eating after the allowable time.
  - **Q:** How does **Ben Azzai** learn that it is only the korbon that becomes passul, and not the Kohen? **A:** Either he learns it from the drasha of the **Others**, or he learns it from the words “lo yeiratzev”, which is language that is appropriate for a korbon, not for the Kohen.
  - **Q:** We see in a Braisa that there is another basis for saying that a delayed korbon does not become ineffective, based on comparing all korbanos to bechor, which itself is compared to maaser sheini, and this hekesh teaches that just as maaser sheini doesn’t become passul after a year, neither does bechor (although at that point it has been delayed in coming). If so, why did **Ben Azzai** need to learn this from “oso”? **A:** If we only had the pasuk of bechor we would say that bechor is different because it is not being brought for a purpose of kapparah or appeasement. However, a korbon that is brought for that purpose may become ineffective if it was delayed in being brought.
  - **Q:** Another Gemara learns another basis for saying that a delayed korbon does not become ineffective, based on the pasuk of “v’haya becha cheit”, which teaches that the person has sinned by delaying the korbon, but there is no psul in the korbon itself!? **A: R’ Ben Azzai** uses this pasuk to teach that it is only the person who has sinned, and not the person’s wife. We find the concept that a person’s wife is punished if a person does not repay for items he stole. We would think that in this situation she would

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be punished as well (for not bringing the korbon when he was supposed to). The pasuk of “v’haya becha cheit” teaches that she is not punished for this.

- **Q:** What does **R’ Eliezer** do with the pasuk of “lo yeichasheiv”, which the **Others** used to teach that the korbon becomes passul for bad intent? **A:** He uses it for the drasha of **R’ Yannai**, which says, that if there is another intent mixed in with the piggul intent, the korbon does not become piggul.
  - **R’ Mari** said, that **R’ Yannai** said, that “lo yeichasheiv” creates a chiyuv malkus for one who has piggul intention.
    - **Q:** **R’ Ashi** asked, this is a lav without an action, and there is no malkus for such a lav!?  
**A:** **R’ Mari** said, this follows **R’ Yehuda**, who says that even such a lav gets malkus.

### MISHNA

- The general rule is, anyone who shechts, does kabbalah, holacha, or zrika with intent to eat something that is meant to be eaten, or to burn something that is meant to be burned, and this intent was regarding something the size of a kezayis, if the intent was to eat or burn it beyond the allowable area, the korbon is passul but there is no kares if the korbon is eaten. If the intent was to eat or burn it beyond the allowable time, the korbon is piggul and there is kares if the korbon is eaten, as long as the “matir” (the blood) was offered as it is required to be.
  - What is meant that the matir is offered as it is required to be? If he shechted without saying anything (without a bad intent) and he then did the kabbalah, holacha, and zrika with intent for beyond its time, or if he shechted with intent for beyond its time and then did the kabbalah, holacha, and zrika without any bad intent, or if he shechted, and did the kabbalah, holacha, and zrika all with intent for beyond its time, this would be a case where the matir was offered as required.
  - What is meant that the matir is not offered as it is required to be? If he shechted with intent for beyond its allowable place and then did the kabbalah, holacha, and zrika with intent for beyond its time, or if he shechted with intent for beyond its allowable time and then did the kabbalah, holacha, and zrika with intent for beyond its allowable place, or if he did the shechita, kabbalah, holacha, and zrika with intent for beyond its allowable place, or in the case of a Pesach or chatas he shechted it not for its sake and then did the kabbalah, holacha, and zrika with intent for beyond its time, or if he shechted with intent for beyond its time and then did the kabbalah, holacha, and zrika with intent for beyond its allowable place, or if he did the shechita, kabbalah, holacha, and zrika not for its own sake, these would be cases of where the matir was not offered as it is required to be.
  - If the Kohen intended to eat a kezayis beyond its allowable place and then intended to eat a kezayis beyond its time, or visa-versa, or he intended to eat a half of a kezayis beyond its allowable place and then intended to eat a half kezayis beyond its time, or visa-versa, the korbon will be passul but there will not be kares for then eating the korbon. **R’ Yehuda** says, the general rule is, if the intent regarding beyond its time precedes the intent for beyond its allowable place, the korbon becomes piggul and there is kares. If the intent for beyond its allowable place precedes the intent for beyond its time, the korbon is passul and there is no kares. The **Chachomim** say that in either case the korbon is passul and there is no kares.
  - If there is intent to eat a half of a kezayis and to burn a half of a kezayis beyond its allowable place or beyond its time, the korbon is valid, because eating and burning do not combine.

### GEMARA

- **Ilfa** said, the machlokes between the **T”K** and **R’ Yehuda** is regarding when the two intents are had during two avodos, but if the two intents were had during a single avodah all would agree that there is a mixing of intents and there is no piggul. **R’ Yochanan** said, the machlokes is even when both intents were had during a single avodah.
  - **Q:** The view of **Ilfa** makes sense – since the beginning of the Mishna is discussing two avodos, the machlokes is also in a case of two avodos. However, according to **R’ Yochanan**, can we say that the beginning of the Mishna discusses two avodos and the machlokes is discussing a case of one avodah!? **A:**

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Yes, the beginning of the Mishna discusses two avodos and the machlokes is discussing a case of one avodah or a case of two avodos.

- **Q:** The Mishna said that **R' Yehuda** gave a “general rule”. Now, according to **Ilfa** this is not a general rule, because it depends on whether the intents were had in one avodah or in two avodos!? This remains a KASHYEH.

### -----Daf 30-----

- A Mishna says, if a person says “this animal should be a temurah for an Olah, a temurah for a Shelamim”, **R' Meir** says the animal becomes a temurah for an Olah. **R' Yose** says, if the person intended to make this full statement from the onset (it wasn't because he changed his mind mid-sentence) it is as if he said it simultaneously, and the animal becomes a temurah for an Olah and for a Shelamim. However, if the second statement was due to a change in mind, it is only a temurah for an olah.
  - **Q:** What would **R' Meir** hold if a person says, “this animal should be a temurah for an olah and a shelamim” (without saying the word “temurah” a second time)? What about where the person said “let half be a temurah for an olah and half a temurah for a shelamim”? **A: Abaye** said, that in this last case **R' Meir** would agree that both designations take effect, but **Rava** said, the machlokes would even be in this last case.
    - **Q: Rava** asked **Abaye**, according to you our Mishna is difficult. The Mishna speaks of where two intentions were had during the shechita, which is like the case of saying that half should be for an olah and half for a shelamim, and yet there is a machlokes in our Mishna!? **A: Abaye** said, the act of shechita is not viewed as happening at the very end of the act of shechita, rather it is viewed as taking place from the beginning until the end. The Mishna is therefore speaking of where he intended for beyond its time during the cutting of one “siman” (the trachea or esophagus) and had an intent for beyond its allowable place during the cutting of the other siman.
      - **Q:** The act of kemitza which is done with two intentions is like the case of saying that half should be for an olah and half for a shelamim, and yet there is a machlokes in a Mishna!? **A: Abaye** said, in that Mishna also, the case is where he had one intent during the kemitza of the flour and another intent during the kemitza of the levonah.
      - **Q:** There is the case of the chatas mincha, which has no levonah, and yet there is a machlokes there when both intentions were had during the kemitza!? **A: Abaye** said, there actually is no machlokes in that case. **R' Ashi** said, even if they do argue, we can say that they are arguing where he had one intention during one step of the holacha and the other intention during another step.
      - **R' Simi bar Ashi** held like **Abaye**, and **R' Huna bar Nosson** held like **Rava**.
  - **R' Dimi** said that the view of **R' Meir** is the same as the view of **R' Yehuda** in our Mishna, which is that when two things are said we give more significance to the first thing. We see this in our Mishna where **R' Yehuda** says a general rule, that if the intent for beyond its time was had first, the korbon is piggul and carries kares. **Abaye** asked, **Rabbah bar Chana in the name of R' Yochanan** said that **R' Meir** and **R' Yose** actually both agree that we do not give more significance to the first thing that is said. If so, **R' Meir** does not hold like **R' Yehuda**!? **R' Dimi** answered, you can't say that **R' Meir** and **R' Yose** don't argue, because we clearly see that they do! **Abaye** said, they disagree only regarding the narrow matter in which they argue, but not more globally beyond that. In fact, we find that **R' Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of R' Yochanan** said, **R' Meir** and **R' Yose** agree that where the person said “let the olah designation take effect and then let the shelamim designation take effect”, only the first designation takes effect. If he said “let this designation take effect only if that designation takes effect” all agree that they would both take effect. The machlokes is where he said “this is a temuras olah, a temuras shelamim”. In that case **R' Meir** says, since he added the second “temuras” it shows that he was retracting from his first statement, and a retraction is ineffective. **R' Yose** says, the reason he didn't just

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say “temuras olah and shelamim” is because he felt that would suggest that half should be a temuras olah and half should be a temuras shelamim. He used the word temuras a second time to show that the entire animal should be a temurah for an olah and a temurah for a shelamim. We see that **R’ Meir** doesn’t hold that we give more significance to the first statement that is said! **R’ Dimi** answered, **Rabbah bar bar Chana** says that they don’t argue, but I hold that they do argue regarding this issue.

- **Q: Ulla** (or **R’ Oshaya**) asked, when **R’ Yehuda and the Rabanan** argue in the Mishna, is the case where the person had an intent for “a kezayis beyond its time, a kezayis beyond its allowable place”, or was the intent for “a kezayis beyond its time **and** a kezayis beyond its allowable place”? If the case is without the “and”, then maybe it is only there where **R’ Yehuda** says we follow the first phrase, but if he said “and” he would agree that there is a mixing of intents and the korbon would therefore not be piggul. If the case is where he said “and”, and still **R’ Yehuda** says we follow the first phrase, then certainly in a case where he did not say “and” he would follow the first phrase. **A:** We can answer from a question that **Levi** asked **Rebbi**. He asked, what is the halacha according to **R’ Yehuda** if the Kohen intended to eat “a kezayis tomorrow outside of its allowable place”? **Rebbi** said, this is a great question. The answer is, that this would make a mixture of intentions and it would therefore not become piggul. **R’ Shimon the son of Rebbi** said, this seems to be suggested by our Mishna as well. The Mishna gave the examples of “a kezayis tomorrow, a kezayis outside its place” and visa-versa, and “a half kezayis tomorrow and a half kezayis outside its place” and visa-versa, and said that in those cases **R’ Yehuda** argued. This would suggest that in other cases he would agree that it is a mixture of intents and would not become piggul. **Rebbi** told him, the Mishna only suggests that to you, because I taught you the Mishna as including the cases with the “and” and without the “and”. However, to **Levi** I only taught one version, and when he heard the talmidim learning both versions it raised his question. It must be that **Levi** was taught the version of “a kezayis beyond its time, a kezayis beyond its allowable place” and by asking regarding the case of “a kezayis tomorrow outside of its allowable place” and getting the answer from **Rebbi** that it is a mixing of intentions, without **Rebbi** getting annoyed at the question, it showed that it is only in that case that it is a mixture of intents, but the case of “and” would be two separate statements according to **R’ Yehuda**. Based on this we see that the proper version of the Mishna is even with the “and”.

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- If the Kohen intended to consume half a kezayis beyond its time and another half a kezayis beyond its allowable place and then yet another half a kezayis beyond its time, **Rava** says the piggul “has awoken” and the korbon is piggul. **R’ Hamnuna** says it is considered to be a mixing of intents and it is passul, but there is no kares.
  - **Rava** brings a proof from a Mishna regarding tumah, which says that where there was a full kibeitza of food that was a rishon l’tumah, and another kibeitza that was a sheini l’tumah, and they were split in half, and half of the one mixed with half of the other, the mixture has the status of a sheini. However, if the two half kibeitza’s of the rishon were recombined, it would again have the status of a rishon. We see this concept that the two things that are separate can be recombined, and the same would hold true for piggul.
    - **R’ Hamnuna** does not agree with this proof. He says the cases are different, because in the case of tumah there was a full required amount at the onset – a kibeitza. In our case of piggul there was not a full kezayis at the onset, and that is why we will not say that it later combines.
  - **R’ Hamnuna** brings a proof from a Mishna regarding tumah, which says that a half kibeitza of a rishon can combine with a half kibeitza of a sheini to be considered a sheini and make things tamei as a sheini would. This suggests that even if another half kibeitza of a rishon was added to the mixture it would not change the status to a rishon.
    - **Rava** would say that the Mishna be talking about a case of where another half kibeitza is not added, but if it were, it may be that it would be treated as a rishon.
  - **R’ Dimi** said, if the Kohen intended to consume half a kezayis beyond its place and another half a kezayis beyond its time and then yet another half a kezayis beyond its time, **Bar Kappara** taught that it would be piggul, because the half kezayis of beyond its place is not effective to separate the two half kezayis of beyond its time that were done one after the other.

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- **Ravin** said, if the Kohen intended to consume half a kezayis beyond its time and another half a kezayis beyond its time and then yet another half a kezayis beyond its place, **Bar Kappara** taught that it would be piggul, because the half kezayis of beyond its place is not effective to separate the two half kezayisim of beyond its time that were done one after the other.
- **R' Ashi** said, if the Kohen intended to consume half a kezayis beyond its time and another full kezayis – half for beyond its place and half for beyond its time, **Bar Kappara** taught that it would be piggul, because the half kezayis of beyond its place is not effective to separate the two half kezayisim of beyond its time that were done.
- **R' Yannai** said, an intent to give the korban to dogs to eat beyond its time is considered a “consumption”, as can be seen in a pasuk, and would therefore make the korban piggul.
  - **Q: R' Ami** asked, if so, there is a pasuk that refers to burning as consumption, and therefore if he has an intent to burn something on a fire other than the Mizbe'ach beyond its time it should also become piggul!? However, this can't be, because a Mishna says that an intent to eat beyond its time cannot be combined with an intent to burn on the Mizbe'ach beyond its time. This shows that consumption by fire is not the same as consumption by people, even though the pasuk refers to burning as “eating”. In this same way, the pasuk that refers to the dog's eating as “eating” should not be the same as human eating!? **A:** If he would intend to burn the korban beyond its time and he used verbiage of “consumption”, it actually would combine. The Mishna is talking about where he uses verbiage of “haktara”, and that is why it can't combine with human consumption.
- **Q: R' Assi** asked, what if he intends that a kezayis will be eaten beyond its time or place by two people? Do we follow the intent – which consisted of the required amount, or do we follow the ones who will consume – which makes it less than the required amount per person and it therefore could not make piggul? **A: Abaye** said, the Mishna says that if he intends to eat half a kezayis and burn half a kezayis, both beyond the time or place, it is valid, because the eating and burning don't combine. This suggests that the problem is that it is eating and burning, but if it was eating and eating – where there are two people eating the one kezayis – it seems that it would combine and it would make it into piggul.
- **Q: Rava** asked, what if he intends to eat a kezayis beyond its time or place, but he intends to do so in longer than “kidei achilas pras”? Do we compare this eating to consumption of the Mizbe'ach, which doesn't have this time requirement or do we compare it to a regular human eating, which does? **A: Abaye** said, the Mishna says that if he intends to eat half a kezayis and burn half a kezayis, both beyond the time or place, it is valid, because the eating and burning don't combine. This suggests that if it was eating and eating in a way that is similar to eating and burning it would be piggul. Presumably this means that if the eating and eating was done in more time than kidei achilas pras, like burning, and we see that it does become piggul.
  - The Gemara says this is no proof, because the intent to burn may have been to burn it in a very large fire, where it would not take longer than kidei achilas pras to burn it.

### LECHOL KACHATZI ZAYIS ULIHAKTIR KACHATZI ZAYIS KASHER

- **Q:** The Mishna suggests that the reason the two intents don't combine is that one intent was for eating and the other was for burning. However, in the similar case of eating a half kezayis of something that is meant to be eaten and eating another half kezayis of something that is not meant to be eaten it would combine. Now, the earlier part of the Mishna specifically said that the intent only makes it passul when he intends something that is meant to be eaten or burns something that is meant to be burned!? **A: R' Yirmiya** said, this later part of the Mishna is the view of **R' Eliezer**, who argues on the **Rabanan** in a Mishna and says that when an intent is made to eat something that is meant to be burned, or to burn something that is meant to be eaten, beyond its place or time, it does make the korban passul. **A2: Abaye** said that this later part of the Mishna can even be following the view of the **Rabanan**, and the inference from the Mishna is not that an intent to eat something that is not meant to be eaten combines, but rather that if he intends to eat half of a kezayis and then another half of a kezayis of something that is meant to be eaten, they combine.
  - **Q:** According to **Abaye**, what is the chiddush? The earlier parts of the Mishna teach that intents to eat things that are meant to be eaten combine, and we can also learn from there that if only things that are meant to be eaten combine, certainly intents for eating and burning do not combine, so what is this part

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of the Mishna coming to teach? **A:** The Mishna is teaching that intents for eating and burning do not combine. We would not be able to learn this from the fact that intents for eating something that is meant to be eaten and to eat something that is not meant to be eaten do not combine, because we would say that those don't combine because it involves an intent to do something that is not the normal way of doing it. However, an intent to eat something that is meant to be eaten and an intent to burn something that is meant to be burned should combine, because they are both an intent to do something that is meant to be done. Therefore, the Mishna needs to teach that these intents also do not combine.

### HADRAN ALACH PEREK KOL HAZEVA'CHIM!!!

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### PEREK KOL HAPSULIN -- PEREK SHLISHI

#### MISHNA

- If a passul person shechted a korbon it is valid, because shechita of a korbon is valid to be done by a non-Kohen, women, slaves, and people who are tamei; even kodshei kodashim, as long as they are careful that the tamei people don't touch the meat. Therefore, if any of these people shecht with a piggul intention, it makes the korbon passul. If any of these passul people did kabbalah with an intent for beyond its time or place, if there is still lifeblood coming from the animal, a valid person should go and do a kabbalah.
- If a valid Kohen did the kabbalah and then gave the blood to a passul, he should then give it back to the valid person who can then continue with the avodah. If he did the kabbalah with his right hand and then transferred it to his left hand, he should give it back to his right hand. If he did the kabbalah in a kli shareis and then transferred it to a regular keili, he should put it back into a kli shareis. If the blood spilled from the kli shareis onto the floor and he gathered it up back into the keili, it is valid.
- If a passul Kohen applies the blood onto the ramp of the Mizbe'ach (instead of the Mizbe'ach itself), or onto the part of the Mizbe'ach that is not opposite the base, or he applied blood that should be applied below the "chut hasikra" above it, or visa-versa, or he applied blood that should have been applied on the inside Mizbe'ach on the outside Mizbe'ach, or visa-versa, in all these cases it is passul, but if there is still lifeblood coming from the neck of the animal, a valid Kohen should do a kabbalah on that blood and can then complete the other avodos with it.

#### GEMARA

- **Q:** The Mishna says "if a passul person shechted", which suggests that this can be done b'dieved, but not l'chatchila. However, a Braisa says that it is even l'chatchila!? **A:** Our Mishna would agree that a passul may shecht l'chatchila. However, the tamei person may only shecht b'dieved, as a gezeira that he may come to touch the meat. Since this person is included in the list, the Mishna writes verbiage that suggests b'dieved.
  - **Q:** A Braisa learns a hekesh from semicha to shechita, which teaches that just as semicha must be done by a tahor person, shechita must also be done by a tahor person. We see that shechita by a tamei person is passul even b'dieved!? **A:** The Braisa is giving the ruling D'Rabanan, but D'Oraisa it is valid b'dieved.
  - **Q:** Semicha must be done by a tahor person because the pasuk says "lifnei Hashem". By shechita the pasuk also says "lifnei Hashem" and therefore even D'Oraisa a tamei person should be passul, because the tamei person can't be in the Azarah – "lifnei Hashem", which is where the korbon must be shechted!? **A:** He can stand outside the Azarah and use a very long knife and shecht the animal which is inside the Azarah.
    - **Q:** If so, semicha is also possible by having the tamei person stand outside and only stick his hands into the Azarah, so why does the Braisa say that that is assur? **A:** The Braisa holds that partial entry into the Azarah is considered to be full entry and therefore it is assur.

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- **R' Chisda** had a version of the Braisa that learned semicha from shechita – just as shechita must be done by a tahor person, the same is true for semicha.
  - **Q:** The Gemara asks, the same way we learn that a tamei person may not do shechita, based on the pasuk of “lifnei Hashem”, we should also learn that a tamei person may not do semicha, because the pasuk there also says “lifnei Hashem”, so why do we need to learn this from shechita? **A:** Semicha can be done from outside by having him only stick his hands into the Azarah.
    - **Q:** Shechita can also be done from outside, using a long knife!? **A:** The Braisa follows the view of **Shimon Hateimani** who darshens the pasuk to teach that the shochet himself must also be in the Azarah.
- **Ulla in the name of Reish Lakish** said, a tamei person who puts only his hands into the Azarah would get malkus. This is based on the pasuk that discusses the issur of a tamei person to touch kodesh and to enter the Mikdash. This creates a hekesh from touching to entering – just as a partial touching is treated as a full touching, so too a partial entering is treated as a full entering.
  - **Q: R' Hoshaya** asked **Ulla**, a Braisa says, if the 8<sup>th</sup> day of the taharah process of a metzora (on which he must stick his thumbs into the Azarah to have blood applied to them) falls out on Erev Pesach (so he must become tahor and complete the process so that he can eat the Korbon Pesach that night) and he became a baal keri on that day and went to the mikvah (so he is now a tvul yom), the **Chachomim** said, although any other tvul yom of a baal keri may not enter onto the Har Habayis, this person may, because it is better that he bring the Pesach, which is an assei that carries the kares penalty, and be over the assei that doesn't carry kares (getting rid of a baal keri from the Har Habayis). [**R' Yochanan** says, getting rid of a baal keri it is not even an assei, but was actually a later gezeira that was made.] Now, if partial entry is considered as full entry, how can this tvul yom put his thumbs into the Azarah? Entering the Azarah for such a person would also be in violation of an assei that carries the kares penalty!? **A: Ulla** said, the case of metzora is different. The Torah allows the metzora, who is not yet fully tahor, to stick his thumbs into the Azarah. Since it is permitted on account of his being a metzora, it is also permitted on account of his being a baal keri.
    - **R' Yosef** said, **Ulla** would similarly hold that if most of Klal Yisrael were zavim and then became tamei meis they would be allowed to bring a Korbon Pesach, because since their tumah is mutar for the tumas meis, it also becomes mutar for the tumas zav as well. **Abaye** asked, the cases are very different! In this case the tumas zav came first, so he would not hold that it is removed with the removal of the tumas meis, which came on later!? Did you rather mean the case of where the majority were tamei meis and then also became zavim? **R' Yosef** said, that is the case I was referring to.
      - **Q: Abaye** asked, the cases are still not similar. Regarding a metzora there is a heter for him to stick his thumbs into the Azarah, and since it is mutar although he is tamei as a metzora it is mutar although he is tamei as a tvul yom as well. However, in the case of tumah for the Korbon Pesach, the tumah is only pushed away, it is not mutar. Therefore, it may be that it is only pushed away for tumas meis, but not for tumas zav!? **A: Rava** said, the exact opposite is more logical. A metzora is mutar to stick his thumbs into the Azarah, and it makes sense to say that the heter only extends for the tumas metzora, not for another tumah, but regarding Korbon Pesach, since tumah is pushed away, it would make sense to say that it pushes away multiple tumas as well.
        - We see that both **Abaye and Rava** hold that tumah is merely pushed away when the majority of the tzibbur becomes tamei – it does not actually become mutar.

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- The Gemara had quoted the view of **Ulla in the name of Reish Lakish** that a partial entry into the Azarah is considered to be a full entry.
  - **Q:** Maybe we can support this from a Braisa. The Braisa says that the shechita of all korbanos must immediately follow the semicha (without moving to another place) except for the shechita of the korban of a metzora, because the semicha had to be done at the Niknor Gate, because the metzora could not enter the Azarah until after having the blood applied to him. Since the shechita had to be done in the north of the Azarah, the semicha was done and the animal was then moved inside. Now, if partial entry is not deemed to be full entry, why couldn't the metzora stick his hands from the Niknor Gate into the northern half of the Azarah and have the shechita immediately follow the semicha? It must be that a partial entry into the Azarah is considered to be a full entry! **A: R' Yosef** said this is no proof. The Braisa may follow the view of **R' Yose the son of R' Yehuda**, who says that a korban that has to be shechted in the north of the Azarah could not be shechted right near the Niknor Gate, because it would have to be much deeper into the Azarah (he has a more limited understanding of the area considered to be "north").
    - **Q:** If so, why couldn't they make another door further north, opposite the area where the korban could be shechted, and then have the metzora's semicha and the shechita done, one immediately following the other? **A: Abaye and Rava** said that the entire structure of the Mikdash was given to us by Hashem, and therefore we may not add or change anything.
    - **Another version of R' Yosef** is that he said that semicha in the Azarah would require the head and most of the body of the metzora to enter the Azarah, because semicha must be done using all the strength of the person. Therefore, the reason it could not be done there is because most of his body would have to enter, and there is no proof that a partial entry is considered to be a full entry.
    - **Q:** What does the Braisa hold? If it holds that the semicha of a metzora is required D'Oraisa *and* that the requirement that the shechita immediately follow the semicha is D'Oraisa, then he should be allowed to enter the Azarah to do the semicha, because the Torah allows it!? **A: R' Ada bar Masna** said, it is allowed D'Oraisa. However, the **Rabanan** were goizer that he not walk into the Azarah as a gezeira to prevent him from taking any extra steps into the Azarah, because that would be assur and would carry kares. **A2: Others** say that **R' Ada bar Masna** said that the semicha of a metzora is required D'Oraisa, but the requirement that the shechita immediately follow the semicha is not D'Oraisa, and that is why he may not enter the Azarah.
      - **Q:** The Braisa quoted earlier said that a tamei may not do semicha. Now if the requirement that the shechita immediately follow the semicha is not D'Oraisa, why can't a tamei do semicha outside the Azarah and then have the animal brought inside for the shechita? **A:** Rather, the answer must have been that the semicha of a metzora is not required D'Oraisa, but the requirement that the shechita immediately follow the semicha is D'Oraisa.
  - **Ravina** said that **Reish Lakish** only said this ruling with regard to malkus, not kares.
  - **Ravin in the name of R' Avahu** said that **Reish Lakish's** ruling was said with regard to a tamei person who touched kodesh, as we learned elsewhere that if a tamei person touches kodesh, **Reish Lakish** says he gets malkus based on the lav of "b'chol kodesh lo sigah" and **R' Yochanan** says that he does not, because that pasuk is referring to terumah, not kodesh.
    - **Q:** According to **Reish Lakish**, is that pasuk really available for this drasha? **Reish Lakish** himself uses this pasuk to teach a warning against a tamei person eating meat of kodashim!? **A:** From the fact that the pasuk uses verbiage of "sigah" (touching) it teaches a warning against touching. The warning against eating is taught from a hekesh between kodashim and entering the Beis Hamikdash – just as with regard to the entering it refers to an issur that carries kares, so too the kodashim refers to something that carries kares, which must be eating kodashim when tamei, because there is no kares for touching kodashim when tamei.

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- There is a Braisa that says like **Reish Lakish**, that the pasuk of “b’chol kodesh lo sigah” is a warning against eating kodashim when a person is tamei, and it can’t refer to simply touching, because that would not carry kares, and the hekesh teaches that the pasuk is talking about something that has a chiyuv kares.
- **Q:** We learned that **Reish Lakish** uses this pasuk to teach a warning even against a tamei person eating kodashim ,even before the blood is offered. Now, in that case there is no kares. We see that the pasuk is not limited to something with a kares penalty!? **A:** The issur of a tamei person eating the kodashim before the blood is offered is learned from the words “b’chol kodesh”, but the main part of the pasuk refers only to something which carries a kares penalty.